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Abstract
Misinformation is a serious concern for societies across the globe. To design effective
interventions to combat the belief in and spread of misinformation, we must understand
which psychological processes influence susceptibility to misinformation. This paper tests the
widely assumed -- but largely untested -- claim that people are worse at identifying true
versus false headlines when the headlines are emotionally provocative. Consistent with this
proposal, we found correlational evidence that overall emotional response at the headline
level is associated with diminished truth discernment, except for experienced anger which
was associated with increased truth discernment. A second set of studies tested a popular
emotion regulation intervention where people were asked to apply either emotional
suppression or emotion reappraisal techniques when considering the veracity of several
headlines. In contrast to the correlation results, we found no evidence that emotion regulation
helped people distinguish false from true news headlines.
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Introduction
Fake news - news that mimics true media content, but is completely invented - has
become a major source of concern in society, and focus of academic research (Berinsky,
2017; Grinberg et al., 2019; Lazer et al., 2018; McLaughlin, 2018; Pennycook et al., 2021;
Pennycook & Rand, 2021; Vosoughi et al., 2018).  Besides the practical importance of
decreasing belief in misinformation, researching fake news can help us understand deeper
theoretical questions regarding how reasoning goes awry and makes people believe in false
statements and how they judge the veracity of information (Brashier & Marsh, 2020).
This paper sheds light on this issue by investigating emotional processes behind belief
in fake news. News - and fake news in particular - can be highly emotionally evocative,
which may contribute to its spread online (Brady et al., 2017). It has been suggested in
various popular press outlets that people fall for fake news precisely because of its
emotionally provocative nature (Barr, 2019; Lynch, 2019). This idea also logically follows
from previous theoretical work on misinformation and deliberation (Bago et al., 2020;1
Pennycook & Rand, 2019). Taking a dual-process perspective on misinformation, Pennycook
and Rand (2019) concluded  that when people engage in deliberation, they are more likely to
correctly distinguish fake content from real, compared to when they rely on their intuitions.
Importantly, emotions have been widely identified as a potential cause for erroneous intuitive
responses (and people's lack of deliberation) in many contexts (Holland et al., 2012; Lerner2
& Tiedens, 2006; Slovic et al., 2007).
Despite the intuitive appeal of this account, there is little direct supporting empirical
evidence. There is some evidence that emotions make people believe in false, but not true,
headlines (Martel et al., 2020); but this work only measured mood prior to exposure to the
news, and manipulated participants’ overall reliance on emotion, rather than examining the
emotions induced by the information content itself. Although these findings suggest that
emotionality of headlines might cause people to preferentially believe in false headlines, they
do not provide direct evidence of this claim.
Here, we address this question. In a first study, we directly examine whether
experienced emotions are predictive of susceptibility to misinformation, using correlational
data. We found evidence that the majority of emotions are associated with diminished truth
discernment; that is, people who feel an emotion -- any emotion other than anger -- after
2 When we refer to “emotions”, we always refer to the 6 basic emotions (Ekman, 1992), as they are
frequently associated with intuition, or identified as intuitive processes themselves (Evans, 2012),
unlike more complex emotions such as guilt or pride.
1 We refer to deliberation from the dual process perspective (Evans & Stanovich, 2013); that is, a
process that requires working memory and cognitive control to operate.
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reading a headline are more likely to erroneously believe that false headlines are true,
compared to those who felt no emotion.
Having established that experiencing emotion is related to belief in fake news, in three
additional studies we tested an intervention to make people inhibit their emotional response,
thus opening the door for deliberation. In the first of the three experiments, we
experimentally induce subjects to control their emotions by inducing them to use two
well-documented emotion regulation techniques: suppression and cognitive reappraisal.
These emotion regulation techniques are quite popular in the literature and have been used to
alter decision outcomes in many tasks in which responding is highly influenced by emotions
(Feinberg et al., 2012; van’t Wout et al., 2010). After finding some evidence for the
effectiveness of emotion suppression against belief in fake news, we conducted 2 further
studies to try to replicate the findings both with older (Study 3) and newer (Study 4)
headlines. However, the replication studies were unsuccessful. Overall, we find little credible
evidence that emotion regulation techniques help reduce belief in fake news.
Study 1
Methods
Participants. In total, 998 participants (405 females, 579 males and 7 others, Mean age =
38.4 years, SD = 10.9 years) took part in this study, who were recruited through MTurk, and
completed the experiment online. In total, 444 people were Liberals, and 307 were
Conservatives, 221 were moderates, and 24 “haven’t thought much about it.”
Materials & Procedure
News headlines. We used a pool of 24 items, taken from Pennycook and Rand (2018), half of
which were real (true) and the other fake (false). Moreover, half of the items were
Republican-consistent and the other half were Democrat-consistent items, based on a pretest.
Participants were presented with 16 randomly selected headlines altogether; 4 from each
category (i.e., Republican-consistent fake, Republican-consistent real, Democrat-consistent
fake, Democrat-consistent real). Headlines were presented in a random order. For each
headline, participants were asked the following question: “Do you think this headline
accurately describes an event that actually happened?” with the response options “Yes/No”.
Afterwards, participants were also asked about their intention to read more about the story
and share it on social media: “If it was possible, would you click on this headline to read the
full story? (Yes/No)” and “If you were to see the above article online, would you share it?
(Yes/No)”. The headlines are available in the OSF page of the project.
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Emotion measures. We measured the 6 basic emotions (Ekman, 1992): fear, anger, disgust,
happiness, sadness, surprise. To measure emotional responses to each headline, we asked
participants to select the icon(s) that best represented their emotional state when they read the
headline, and then we presented them with 6 icons representing each distinctive emotion and
a “None/Other” option. To rule out potential biases arising from verbal reports of emotional
reactions, some researchers have used  a set of facial expressions representing each
distinctive emotion (see, for example: Gutierrez & Giner-Sorolla, 2007). However, the
recognition of these facial expressions comes with its own set of potential biases, for
example, expressions are more likely to be misjudged if the ethnicity of the participant and
the person in the picture are different (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002), while gaze patterns and
subjective attractiveness could also moderate response patterns (Langner et al., 2010). Hence,
instead of facial expressions, we presented emoticons – widely used in online
communications – to avoid these potential biases, and to generate an approach which could
be used subsequently for valid cross-cultural comparisons. Figure 1 presents our selection of
emoticons. To make sure that participants indeed correctly recognize these emoticons, we
conducted a pre-test with 100 participants. In this pre-test, participants were asked to indicate
which emotion is represented by a given emoticon. They selected their response from a list:
“anger”, “fear”, “disgust”, “surprise”, “happy”, “sad”, “other, please specify:” (for the
validity of this methodology, see: Frank & Stennett, 2001). Our results showed that the
recognition rate for each one of our emotions were above 80% (anger: 97%, fear: 92%,
disgust: 81%, surprise: 94%, happiness: 100%, sadness: 97%), indicating that our scale is a
valid measure of emotions (e.g., accuracy rates are comparable - and sometimes even better -
than on the widely used Radboud Faces Dataset; Langner et al., 2010).
Figure 1. The emoticons participants were presented with, each represents one particular
emotion. From left to right: anger, disgust, fear, happiness, sadness, surprise. Participants
were also presented with a “Neutral/None of these” option. These emojis were taken from
Facebook, with the exception of fear; this was additionally designed by a graphics designer.
Procedure. In the experiment, we randomized the order in which emoticons were presented
for each participant, but kept the same order for a given participant throughout the
experiment. After a participant selected the emotions she experienced, she was presented with
the emoticons she selected and was asked to rate how much she felt the selected emotions on
a scale from 1 (not very strongly) to 7 (very strongly).
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Half of the participants received the emotion question first , before the accuracy question; the3
other half received these two questions in the reverse order. At the end of each trial, subjects
received the question regarding clicking and sharing (in this order).
After the instructions, participants received one practice problem to make sure they
understood the procedure. At the very beginning of the practice problem, participants were
also told: “In the following question, you will be first asked about what emotions you
experienced when you first read the headline. Each of the six emojis you will see represents
one distinctive emotional expression. Select as many as you want.” After the experiment
participants were presented with the “emotion recognition test” (for description see: emotion
recognition pre-test), and they filled out 7 items of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick,
2005; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016), and the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Gross &
John, 2003). At the end of the questionnaire, we asked various questions regarding
demographics and political orientation.
We classified participants into “Liberal” or “Conservative” based on the question: “Generally
speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a liberal, a conservative, a moderate, or haven't
you thought much about this? (Liberal/Conservative/Moderate/Haven’t thought much about
it)”. If they selected “Conservative” we considered Republican-consistent headlines
“politically concordant” and Democrat-consistent headlines as “politically discordant”;  if
they selected “Liberal”, we considered Democrat-consistent headlines “politically
concordant” and Republican-consistent headlines as “politically discordant”. For participants
who indicated “Moderate” or “Haven’t thought much about it”, all headlines were coded as
politically neutral. We use subject ideology rather than partisanship to classify concordance
because subject partisanship was not collected due to a programming error.
Statistical models. We used mixed effect logistic regression models with items and subjects
as random intercepts, and presence of emotion (0 = no, 1 = yes), veracity of headlines (-0.5 =
fake, 0.5 = real), political concordance (-0.5 = discordant, 0 = neutral,  0.5 = concordant) as
fixed effects. We always tried to fit the maximal model (using all possible random slopes)
and if that didn’t converge or caused singularity issues, we decreased model complexity. If
there were more than one model that converged without a problem with the same level of
random structure complexity, we used AIC to decide which model has the better fit and
reported the results of that model.
All data are available at the OSF page of the project: osf.io/pn8ja
3 We added presentation order to the most critical model, in which we analyze the effect of emotion,
headline veracity and concordance on perceived accuracies, and found no significant main or
interacting effect of order (p > 0.07). Presentation order however did have a main effect on how much
emotion was experienced, b = 0.6, p = 0.0002; people who had to report emotions first, before
accuracy, reported more emotions in general (73%), than people who received the accuracy question
first (65.6%). This suggests that emotions fade; participants are more likely to be aware of them and
report them right when they experience them.
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Results
In 69.3% of trials, people reported experiencing at least one of the six basic emotions
(See Figure 2 for a summary). This result suggests that people tended to experience emotions
in a majority of headlines. We found no evidence that headline veracity is associated with the
presence of emotions in a given headline, b = -0.14, p = 0.47, (68.7% emotional on real,
69.9% emotional on fake), and we also found no relationship with  the headline’s political
concordance, b = 0.23, p  = 0.15, )72.9% emotional on concordant, 69.9% emotional on
discordant). The interaction of veracity and concordance was not significant, b = 0.12, p =
0.71. That is, the concordance relationship with experiencing emotion is independent from
the headline’s actual veracity. Second, we tested whether their average emotional response
(i.e., how much they experienced the emotions they said they experienced) varied by the
headline’s veracity or concordance. We found no significant association with concordance, b
= 0.05, p = 0.42, veracity, b = -1.03, p = 0.7, or their interaction, b = 0.04, p = 0.72. This
suggests that the average strength of an emotion after seeing a particular headline does not
depend on the headline’s veracity or political concordance, but people are more likely to
experience emotions after seeing concordant headlines.
Figure 2. Figure shows percent of headlines in which a given emotion was experienced.
We then turned to our main question of interest - how experiencing emotion
corresponds with  accuracy perceptions (see Figure 3 for a summary). When we regressed
perceived accuracy on veracity, concordance and emotion, the model allowed for the
variation of emotion, concordance and veracity over subjects and emotion and concordance
over items. We found a significant relationship with headline veracity; b = 2.3, p < 0.0001,
the presence of any emotion, b = 1.3, p < 0.0001, (i.e., people are more to believe in
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headlines when experiencing emotions) and an effect of concordance, b = 0.45, p = 0.003. We
also found a significant interaction between emotion and headline veracity, b = -0.4, p = 0.02,
such that truth discernment between true and false was worse for headlines where participants
experienced emotion than those where participants did not experience emotion. In order to
get a better understanding of the two way interaction between veracity and emotion, we
analysed true and false headlines separately from each other; there is a positive association
with emotion for true headlines (model allowed for the variation of emotions over subjects
and items), b = 1.18, p < 0.0001, and there is also a positive association with emotion for fake
headlines (model allowed for the variation of emotions over subjects), with a larger effect
size than for true headlines, b = 1.44, p < 0.0001.  No other interactions were significant in
this model, p > 0.1.
Figure 3. Figure shows perceived accuracy averages as a function of headline veracity and
political concordance, when participants experienced any of the 6 basic emotions in a given
headline, vs when they did not. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
An individual analysis of each separate emotion can be found in the Supplementary
Materials. To summarize, happiness (on discordant headlines) and disgust were associated
with significantly decreased truth discernment, and sadness, surprise and fear had a
non-significant (but negative in sign) association with discernment. Anger, conversely, was
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associated with significantly increased discernment but only on discordant headlines (SI for
further details).
Sharing and clicking intentions. Exploratively, we also conducted an analysis using
sharing and clicking intentions as dependent variables. Figure 4 summarizes results. This
model allowed for the variation of emotion, concordance and veracity over subjects and
emotion over items. We found that emotions had a main effect on sharing intentions, b =
5.26, p < 0.0001, (people are more likely to share emotion-invoking content), as well as
concordance, b = 1.39, p < 0.0001, (people are more likely to share concordant information)
and veracity, b = 1.39, p < 0.0001 (people are more likely to share true headlines). The
three-way interaction was also significant, b = 1.35, p = 0.02. To understand this three way
interaction, we analysed concordant and discordant headlines separately. We find no
significant veracity and emotion interaction in either case, however, the direction of the
coefficients suggests that emotion worsens sharing discernment in discordant headlines (this
model allowed for the variation of emotion over subjects and items and the variation of
veracity over subjects), b = -0.99, p = 0.08, while it increases sharing discernment in
concordant headlines (this model allowed for the variation of emotion over subjects and
items), b = 0.5, p = 0.35, resulting in a significant three-way interaction.
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Figure 4. Figure shows sharing intention averages as a function of headline veracity and
political concordance, when participants experienced any of the 6 basic emotions in a given
headline, vs when they did not. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Figure 5 summarizes results for clicking intentions. This model allowed for the
variation of veracity, concordance and emotions over subjects, and the variation of emotion
over items. We found that emotion had a significant main effect, b = 2.04, p < 0.0001, (people
are more likely to click on emotional content), as well as veracity, b = 1.22, p < 0.0001,
(people are more likely to click on true headlines) and concordance, b = 0.56, p = 0.0002
(people are more likely to click on concordant rather than on discordant headlines). We also
found a significant interaction between veracity and emotion, suggesting that experiencing
emotion was negatively associated with clicking discernment, b = -0.46, p = 0.002, and a
three-way interaction among concordance, veracity and emotion, b = 0.61, p = 0.04,
suggesting that emotion was associated with worse clicking discernment especially on
discordant headlines.
Figure 5. Figure shows clicking intention averages as a function of headline veracity and
political concordance, when participants experienced any of the 6 basic emotions in a given
headline, vs when they did not. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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Discussion
Our data suggest that having an emotional response to a given headline is typically
associated with greater belief for both true and false headlines - and with diminished truth
discernment(although anger was associated with increased discernment on discordant
headlines).  Note that it is possible that the association between truth discernment and
emotions could have been caused by a ceiling effect. That is, emotions might have simply
increased overall belief in headlines, but since belief in true headlines is already
comparatively high, there was less room for belief in true headlines to increase. This (and the
correlational nature of the study) prevents us from drawing any conclusions about causal
effects of emotion on truth discernment.
In Study 2, we build on this by testing the effectiveness of interventions designed to
reduce emotional responses in order to improve discernment. This should also inform us
about the causal relationship between emotions and truth discernment.
Emotion regulation strategies are often employed to achieve a different, often less
(negative) emotional state. The literature offers several emotion regulation strategies (for a
review, see: Gross, 1998). We focus on two well-studied strategies: cognitive reappraisal and
emotion suppression. Reappraisal is defined as: “interpreting potentially emotion-relevant
stimuli in unemotional terms,” while emotion suppression is “inhibiting emotion-expressive
behavior while emotionally aroused” (Gross, 1998, p. 226). These strategies have different
effects on our emotional, physiological and neural states (Gross, 2002). Most importantly,
cognitive reappraisal has been shown to be effective at inducing deliberation, in the presence
of emotional stimuli (Feinberg et al., 2012; van’t Wout et al., 2010). So far, there has been no
strategy identified that induces deliberation when people judge the truth/falsity of news
headlines; all manipulations that have been applied to test the “lack of deliberation”
hypothesis were negative in the sense that they induced intuition, and decreased deliberation
(Bago et al., 2020, Martel et al., 2019; e.g., people were asked to rely on their emotions, or
were forced to make an intuitive decision). Hence, if we find a manipulation that induces
deliberation, we can increase peoples’ discernment performance. Such manipulations could
be directly applicable in practice to fight against fake news.4
In Study 1, we measured the habitual use of these two emotion regulation techniques.
We separately added them to the regression models, together with concordance and headline
veracity. We found that when cognitive reappraisal was included in the models, there was a
main effect of headline veracity; b = 1.78, p < 0.0001, and reappraisal, b = 0.12, p = 0.004,
but there interaction between them was non-significant (although positive in sign), b = 0.05, p
= 0.1. Thus we do not find strong evidence that trait-level emotion reappraisal is associated
with truth discernment performance. No other interaction or main effects were significant.
When including suppression in the models, we found a main effect of headline veracity, b =
4 In Study 1, we did not find evidence that trait level emotional reappraisal correlates with better discernment,
and emotion suppression was even associated with worst discernment (see supplementary materials for details).
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2.58, p < 0.0001, suppression, b = 0.31, p < 0.0001, and concordance, b = 0.69, p < 0.0001.
We also found a significant negative interaction between suppression and veracity, b = -0.13,
p < 0.0001, such that suppression was associated with worse truth discernment. This suggests
that habitual use of emotion regulation techniques might not help people discern the truth of
news headlines. However, note that we only measured trait level emotion regulation and not
state emotion regulation; depending on the task, a lack of correlation between state and trait
emotion regulation has been often observed (Ehring et al., 2010). In other words, this data




Participants. We preregistered 1000 participants in the 3-condition between-subject design.
In total, 1007 participants took part in this experiment, who were recruited through MTurk,
and completed the experiment online. 338 people took part in the Reappraisal condition (144
females, 190 males and 4 others, Mean age = 37.7 years, SD = 10.7 years) 113 were
Republican and 224 were Democrat leaning, while 1 did not respond.  331 additional people
took part in the Suppression condition (130 females, 200 males and 1 other, Mean age = 38.1
years, SD = 10.7 years), among whom 209 were Democrat-leaning, 119 were
Republican-leaning and 3 did not respond. Finally,  338 people took part in the control
condition (135 females, 199 males and 4 others, Mean age = 37.5 years, SD = 11.3 years),
among whom 213 were Democrat-leaning, 123 were Republican-leaning and 2 did not
respond. The preregistration of the experiment is available at:
http://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=n2vv9s
Materials and Procedure
We used the same set of headlines as in Study 1. Participants received 16 headlines
altogether, in a random order – just as in Study 1. After each headline was presented,
participants were asked three questions, always in the following order: perceived accuracy,
willingness to click on the headline, and willingness to share the headline. The questions
asked were the same as in Study 1.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three between-subject conditions: Control,
Emotional Suppression, or Emotional Reappraisal. In the treatment conditions (emotional
suppression and emotional reappraisal conditions) participants received the same instructions
before the first trial of the experiment and after every fourth trial was passed. For both
conditions, we took the instructions from Lee et al. (2013). These procedures have been
shown to effectively evoke emotion regulation strategies, reduce emotional responses and
induce deliberation in moral dilemmas (Feinberg et al., 2012), economic games (van’t Wout
et al., 2010) and policy support (Lee et al., 2013).
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We used the following instructions for the emotional suppression condition:
“As you view and read the headlines, if you have any feelings, please try your best not to let
those feelings show. Read all of the headlines carefully, but try to behave so that someone
watching you would not know that you are feeling anything at all.”
We used the following instructions for the emotion reappraisal condition:
“As you view and read the headlines, please try to adopt a detached and unemotional
attitude. Please try to think about what you are reading objectively. Read all of the headlines
carefully, but please try to think about what you are seeing in such a way that you feel less
emotion.”
Note that this prompt is different from Lee et al.’s instructions as those authors explicitly
motivated people to feel more positive emotion. From Study 1, we know that even positive
emotions, such as happiness, makes people more susceptible to believe in fake news. Hence,
we decided to change the prompt in a way to encourage people to try to feel less emotion
overall.
At the end of the experiment, participants were presented with the 7 item Cognitive
Reflection Task questionnaire, and various questions regarding demographics and political
orientation. As per our pre-registration, we classified participants into “Democrats” and
“Republicans” based on the question: “Which of the following best describes your political
preference? (Strongly Democrat/Democrat/Lean Democrat/ Lean
Republican/Republican/Strong Republican)”. We used this classification to define which
headlines were “politically concordant” and “politically discordant”. To be consistent with
Study 1, we also measured ideology and, as robustness test, conducted our analysis using
ideology to classify political concordance and discordance. We found no meaningful
difference in our results using this measure.
Statistical procedure. We used mixed-effect logistic regression models with items and
subjects as random intercepts, and experimental condition (0 = condition A, 1 = condition B;
which condition counts as A or B depends on the analysis), veracity of headlines (-0.5 =
false, 0.5 = true), political concordance (-0.5 = discordant, 0 = neutral,  0.5 = concordant) as
fixed effects. To define the random structure we started with the maximal model (allowing for
the intercept to vary over subjects and headlines, and all the fixed effects to vary over
headlines and subjects), and if not converged, we started decreasing its complexity. We
summarized the most complex model that converged, if more, similarly complex model
converged, we used the best fitting model based on AIC.
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Results
Figure 3 summarizes the results. As pre-registered, we first tested whether or not there was
any significant difference between the two test conditions in the effectiveness of reducing
perceived accuracy for fake news. As fixed effects, we added concordance, headline veracity
and treatment condition. The model with the most complex random structure that converged
allowed the intercept to vary among subjects and headlines, and allowed for the effect of
headline veracity and concordance to vary over subjects and the effect of condition and
concordance to vary over items. Emotion regulation techniques did not differ in their
effectiveness on increasing discernment; treatment variable had no mean effect, b = 0.06, p =
0.65, it had no significant interaction with headline veracity, b = -0.24, p = 0.2, no interaction
with concordance, b = -0.1, p = 0.38, and no three-way interaction, b = 0.04, p = 0.87.
As a next step, since we found no difference between treatment conditions, we compared the
pooled treatment conditions with the control condition. In this comparison, the model with
the most complex random structure that converged and had the best fit (AIC = 16834)
allowed for the intercept to vary between items and subjects, allowed for the effect of
headline veracity to vary over subjects, and allowed the effect of concordance to vary over
items and subjects. We found a significant main effect of concordance b = 0.4, p = 0.02
(people were more likely to believe in concordant headlines) and headline veracity b = 2.2, p
< 0.0001 (real headlines were perceived as more accurate then fake headlines), but the main
effect of treatment condition was not significant, b = -0.17, p = 0.08. We did not find a
significant interaction between headline veracity and condition b = 0.24, p = 0.08, there was
no significant interaction between treatment and concordance, b = -0.008, p = 0.93, and no
significant three-way interaction between treatment, veracity, and concordance, b = 0.33, p =
0.06.
Based on visual inspection of Figure 6, we exploratively compared each treatment condition
to the control condition separately. We found no interaction between headline veracity and
reappraisal treatment, b = 0.12, p = 0.41, but we found a significant interaction between
veracity and suppression treatment, b = 0.34, p = 0.02. However, since this analysis was not
preregistered and we made a data-driven decision to run the analysis, these results should be
interpreted with caution.
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Figure 6. The figure shows perceived accuracy averages as a function of headline’s
concordance, veracity and experimental condition. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
These results are rather inconclusive. We did not find evidence for the critical two way
interaction, but there seemed to be a tendency toward a rather small effect of emotion
suppression. The effect was so small that it was possible that we simply did not have
sufficient power to detect it. Hence, we conducted two replication studies with larger
samples.
Study 3 - 4
Since emotion suppression had a bigger effect on truth discernment in Study 2, we only used
the emotion suppression prompt in Studies 3 and 4. Prior to these studies we conducted a
simulation-based sample size estimation using the SimR package in R (Green & MacLeod,
2016), based on the observed effect size for the emotion suppression effect, while still
accounting for the random effect structure we a priori observed. This analysis suggested that
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we would need 3000 participants altogether (1500 per condition) to achieve power above
90%. This is the sample size we recruited for both experiments.
Methods
Participants
Study 3. In total, 3001 participants took part in this experiment, who were recruited through
MTurk, and completed the experiment online. 1502 people took part in the Suppression
condition (712 females, 778 males and 12 others, Mean age = 41.3 years, SD = 13.1 years)
601 were Republican and 894 were Democrat leaning.  1499 additional people took part in
the Control condition (704 females, 778 males and 17 others, Mean age = 40.9 years, SD =
12.7 years), among whom 876 were Democrat-leaning,  617 were Republican-leaning. Study
3 was conducted in September, 2020. The preregistration of the experiment is available at:
https://aspredicted.org/blind.php?x=6x5ux8
Study 4. In total, 3032 participants took part in this experiment, who were recruited through
MTurk, and completed the experiment online. 1520 people took part in the Suppression
condition (746 females, 742 males and 21 others, Mean age = 41.2 years, SD = 13.2 years)
561 were Republican and 946 were Democrat leaning. 1512 additional people took part in the
Control condition (724 females, 759 males and 17 others, Mean age = 41.7 years, SD = 12.8
years), among whom 946 were Democrat-leaning, 549 were Republican-leaning. Study 4 was
conducted in January, 2021.
Procedure
Study 3 procedure. We used the exact same procedure as in Study 2, with the exception that
the Reappraisal condition was not administered.
Study 4 procedure. We used newer headlines taken from Pennycook, Binnendyk, et al.,
(2020). They measured 3 types of emotional reactions to each headline: “anger”, “funny” and
“anxiety”. Out of the many headlines they tested, we selected both Republican and Democrat
consistent fake and real headlines that scored highest in these emotion categories (i.e., two
highest scores in the “funny” category within Democrat consistency - fake etc). Altogether
we used 24 headlines, out of which participants were randomly assigned to 16; 4 in each cell
(partisan consistency; and headline veracity).
We further simplified the experiment and only measured perceived accuracy, and not sharing
or clicking intentions. Furthermore, in order to further assure that participants follow and read
the instructions in the emotion regulation condition, participants received the prompt on top
of each individual headline.
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Finally, we also added two attention check questions because of concerns about inattention on
MTurk (Arechar & Rand, 2021): “Puppy is to dog as kitten is to?” and “People are very
busy these days and many do not have time to follow what goes on in the government. We are
testing whether people read questions. To show that you've read this much, answer both
"extremely interested" and "very interested": [5 options]”
Results
Figure 7 summarizes the results for both studies. In Study 3, the model allowed for
the intercept to vary between items and subjects, allowing for the effect of veracity and
concordance to vary of subjects and and concordance to vary over  items. In Study 3, we
found no significant interaction between headline’s veracity and emotion regulation
condition, b = -0.05, p = 0.46, nor a three-way interaction between emotion regulation,
concordance and veracity, b = 0.14, p = 0.14, and emotion regulation also had no main effect,
b = 0.00001, p = 0.99. In Study 4, the model allowed for the intercept to vary between items
and subjects, allowing for the effect of concordance and veracity to vary over subjects and
items. There was no main effect of the emotion regulation condition, b = 0.03, p = 0.55, no
interaction between veracity and emotion regulation condition, b = -0.12, p = 0.16, and no
three-way interaction between condition, veracity and concordance, b = -0.05; p = 0.64. This
suggests that emotion regulation had no effect on truth discernment.
Figure 7. The figure shows perceived accuracy averages as a function of headline’s
concordance, veracity and experimental condition both on Study 3 (left) and Study 4 (right).
Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
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One objection to these results could be that Mturkers simply did not pay any attention
to the manipulation prompt. In both Study 3 and Study 4, we used Mturkers who produced
high quality data in the past; participants were only allowed to enter the experiment if they
had a HIT approval rate of 98% and who at least completed 100 HITs. Furthermore, in Study
4, we also added two attention check questions to the beginning of the experiment (before the
actual headlines were presented). When excluding any participants who failed any of the two
attention check questions, 186 people altogether (i.e., 94% of participants passed the attention
check), we found similar results: Most importantly, neither the two-way interaction between
headline veracity and treatment condition, b = -0.11, p = 0.21, nor the three-way interaction,
between veracity, concordance and treatment condition, b = -0.07, p = 0.5, were significant.
We also conducted a pooled analysis in which we pooled together all studies in which
we had the emotion regulation prompt (that is, we excluded the emotion reappraisal condition
from Study 2). Again, even with a sample size of 6702 participants, we found no evidence
that emotion suppression helped people distinguish fake from true news headlines; the
veracity and condition interaction was not significant, b = - 0.03, p = 0.59, and neither was
the three-way interaction between concordance, emotion suppression condition and headline
veracity, b = 0.14, p = 0.054. The random effect structure of this model that converged
included the random intercepts of subjects and items and allowed for variation of veracity and
concordance over subjects and concordance over items.
One reason we might not have found any effect of emotion regulation is that the
techniques we used to make people regulate their emotional response are disproportionately
better at decreasing anger than any other emotion. Since we observed a positive association
between anger and truth discernment, a potential decrease in anger might have led to worse
truth discernment, while a decrease in any other emotion might have led to better discernment
- and overall, the two effects could have cancelled each other out. To investigate this
possibility,  we classified each news headline from Study 1, as “high anger” and “low anger”
items, based on a median split on how many participants reported feeling anger for each
headline (separately by concordance). When analysing high anger items from Study 2 and
Study 3, surprisingly, we found a significant three-way interaction between condition,
veracity and concordance, b = 0.27, p = 0.02, such that emotion regulation increased
discernment for concordant items, b = 0.19, p = 0.04, but not for discordant items, b = -0.1, p
= 0.23, (and the two way interaction between condition and veracity was not significant, b =
0.06, p = 0.39, and no main effect of condition, b = 0.004, p = 0.93). On low anger items we
found no significant effect of emotion regulation condition (no condition x veracity x
concordance interaction, b = -0.03, p = 0.83,  no condition x veracity interaction, b = 0.004, p
= 0.96, no main effect of condition, b = -0.07, p = 0.1). This suggests that our null effects
were not caused by emotion regulation techniques preferentially decreasing anger.
Discussion
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This study tested the idea that headlines which are more emotionally evocative are
also harder to discern as true or false. In the first study, we found that emotional response, in
general, at the headline level were associated with decreased truth discernment. These
correlational results served as the impetus for the second set of studies to test the
effectiveness of an intervention designed to improve discernment. In this second set of
studies, however, we did not find compelling evidence that an emotion regulation
intervention helps people correctly discern the truth (although we did find some limited
evidence that emotion regulation might help against politically concordant false headlines
that are anger-inducing; nevertheless, this was an unexpected finding of a non-preregistered
analysis, so should be interpreted with caution).
There have been at least two major theories that try to capture how emotions affect
thought. One line of research argues that certain emotions, such as fear and sadness make
people more deliberative, while others, such as anger or happiness, make people less
deliberative (Forgas, 2013; Holland et al., 2012; Lerner & Tiedens, 2006). It has been shown
that deliberation positively affects discernment (Bago et al., 2020). Hence, if certain emotions
induce deliberation people will be more discerning (or if they induce intuition, they will be
less discerning). Our findings provide evidence to the contrary, where we observed no
association or worse discernment for the majority of emotions except anger. Anger, which is
said to be one emotion that induces intuition (Lerner & Tiedens, 2006), is actually correlated
with improved discernment, in all of our dependent variables; perceived accuracy, sharing
and clicking intentions. However, when interpreting specific results, we should keep in mind
that our first study is purely correlational.
The second set of influential theories suggest that people use an “affective heuristic”
(Slovic et al., 2007). That is, people use their affective evaluation of a stimulus to make a
judgment about the stimulus. If the affective evaluation of a headline is negative (e.g., they
feel negative emotions) they will be less likely to believe it (regardless of veracity). This
theory could help us explain the main “effect” of happiness and surprise on perceived
accuracy: happiness and surprise were associated with increased overall belief regardless of
veracity, which is in agreement with this theory. However, sadness had a positive “effect” on
overall belief levels; even though it is a negative emotion. It is also unclear how this theory
could explain the emotional effects on truth discernment. It is possible that emotions have at
least two types of effects on truth judgement; their positive-negative valence increases or
decreases overall belief (under some unknown conditions), while they could also make
deliberative engagement more or less likely. Future research and theorizing on emotion and
thought in truth discernment should address this question.
Since misinformation is a global phenomenon, it is critical to see how generalizable
our results are across countries. This is particularly true given well-documented cross-cultural
variations in emotional responses and emotion regulation more broadly (e.g., Mesquita &
Frijda, 1992). Consistent with our findings, there is some evidence that emotions, in general,
are associated negatively with truth discernment in Nigeria (Rosenzweig et al., 2021). On the
19
other hand, contrary to our results, there has also been some evidence that anger is negatively
associated with truth discernment in both South Korea (Han et al., 2020) and negatively
associated with overall belief in Nigeria (Rosenzweig et al., 2021) in the Covid-19 context,
whereas we observed a positive association in the U.S between anger and truth discernment.
Although it is yet unclear if this difference was created by the difference in contexts
(Covid-19 vs politics) or reflects cultural variation, future research should address this
question.
Although emotions seem to be observationally associated with truth discernment
abilities, we found little evidence that an intervention that directly tried to decrease emotional
processing was helpful. One caveat of our research is that we had no independent
manipulation check (i.e., does our manipulation indeed induce emotion regulation?) but given
the many successes these methods have been used to decrease emotional effects on decision
making, it seems unlikely that the manipulation did not work. Second, in Study 1, we also
had correlational evidence that shows no significant positive associations between
spontaneous emotion regulation (i.e., the frequency people use certain emotion regulation
techniques in their daily lives) and truth discernment performance. It seems more likely that
the canonical emotion regulation techniques that we tested seem to be ineffective at helping
people identify fake news. One potential reason is that inducing emotion regulation made
people focus on their emotions, and what emotions the headline is making them feel, and got
distracted from other cues that would potentially help them discern what was true or false.
Future research could test techniques that induce emotion regulation, but besides making
participants cooler, help them re-focus their attention on the veracity of headlines. While
these could be an interesting theoretical question for future research, using emotion
regulation in its current form is unlikely to help us in the battle against misinformation.
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